Abstract. Electronic cash (e-cash) refers to money exchanged electronically. The main features of traditional cash are usually considered desirable also in the context of e-cash. One such property is off-line transferability, meaning the recipient of a coin in a transaction can transfer it in a later payment transaction to a third person without contacting a central authority. Among security properties, the anonymity of the payer in such transactions has been widely studied. This paper proposes the first efficient and secure transferable e-cash scheme with the strongest achievable anonymity properties, introduced by Canard and Gouget. In particular, it should not be possible for adversaries who receive a coin to decide whether they have owned that coin before. Our proposal is based on two recent cryptographic primitives: the proof system by Groth and Sahai, whose randomizability enables strong anonymity, and the commuting signatures by Fuchsbauer, which allow one to sign values that are only given as encryptions.
Introduction
While electronic cash has long been one of the most challenging problems in cryptography, its use in practice remains rare. Indeed, despite the numerous benefits it may provide, e-cash still has many significant disadvantages. These include susceptibility to fraud, failure of technology and possible surveillance of individuals. With the recent emergence of new communication means and the availability of many applications for smart phones, the interest of the cryptographic community in electronic money has returned. Recent technologies provide the foundations for novel and desirable features such as, among others, the transferability of digital money. The desired security properties for e-cash are today well-known and for transferable e-cash systems anonymity is a particularly delicate issue.
Anonymity properties in transferable e-cash. The traditional properties of anonymous electronic cash are called weak anonymity and strong anonymity. The former means that it is infeasible for an attacker to identify the spender or the recipient in a transaction, and the latter states that it is infeasible for an attacker to decide whether two transactions are done by the same user or not. In [4] Canard and Gouget give a complete taxonomy of anonymity properties for transferable e-cash systems. They observe that in the transferability setting the attacker may recognize a coin that he has already observed during previous transfers. Thus, in addition to the two above traditional properties, they introduce full anonymity (FA), which means that an attacker is not able to recognize a coin he has already observed during a transaction between two honest users ("observe then receive"). They also introduce perfect anonymity (PA), defined as an attacker's inability to decide whether he has already owned a coin he is receiving.
Chaum and Pedersen [6] showed that a payer with unlimited computing power can always recognize his own money if he sees it later being spent; thus, the PA property cannot be achieved against unbounded adversaries. But even when his power is limited, an adversary impersonating the bank can still win the anonymity game, as shown in [4] . Perfect anonymity can therefore not be achieved by a transferable e-cash scheme. Due to this impossibility result, Canard and Gouget [4] introduce two additional anonymity notions called PA 1 and PA 2 . In order to break PA 1 , the adversary is given a coin and must decide whether he has already (passively) seen it in a past transaction ("spend then observe"). For PA 2 , the bank is trusted and the adversary should not be able to decide whether or not he has already owned a coin he is receiving ("spend then receive"). It is shown in [4] that both properties PA 1 and PA 2 are satisfiable and that a transferable e-cash scheme should satisfy full anonymity, PA 1 and PA 2 in order to achieve"optimal" anonymity guarantees. In this paper we maintain these anonymity notions but slightly modify the used terminologies to improve readability.
Related work. Many transferable e-cash schemes have been proposed, but most of them only provide weak [10, 11] or strong anonymity [13, 6, 5, 3] . A generic construction of a transferable e-cash system with FA and PA 1 security from a one satisfying strongly anonymity is shown in [4] . PA 2 remains thus the property that is hardest to achieve.
The first proposal of a transferable e-cash scheme satisfying PA 2 is a theoretical scheme in [4] that cannot be implemented effectively. This is due to its use of complex meta-proofs [12] which allow the blinding of previous transfers of a coin, even w.r.t. a previous owner of that coin.
Subsequently, Fuchsbauer et al. [8] proposed the first practical PA 2 -secure scheme. However, their scheme has the important drawbacks that (i) each user has to keep in memory the data associated to all past transactions to prove her innocence in case of a fraud and (ii) the anonymity of all subsequent owners of a double-spent coin must be revoked in order to trace the defrauder, which constitutes a serous breach of anonymity.
In conclusion, the remaining open problem is an efficient transferable e-cash scheme that satisfies all anonymity properties including PA 2 .
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose such a scheme. More precisely, we describe a new transferable e-cash scheme based on the work on randomization of Groth-Sahai proofs [9, 2] and on the recent primitive of commuting signatures [7] based on them. This yields a new way to efficiently blind previous transfers of a coin and permits to achieve the PA 2 property, without requiring the users to store anything. We moreover believe that the use of Groth-Sahai proofs and commuting signatures in concrete cryptographic applications is technically interesting.
There is a lot of concern regarding anonymity for electronic cash with respect to illegal activities, such as money laundering or financing of terrorism. A possible compromise between user privacy and the prevention of its abuse is to provide the opportunity to appeal to a judge either in case of double-spending or in a court case. In our proposal we introduce a trusted authority called judge, which retrieves the identity of the defrauder after detection of a double-spending (while detection can be performed locally by the bank). Although we do not consider this explicitly, the judge could additionally trace coins and users, as required for fair e-cash [14] . We argue that the use of Groth-Sahai proofs-which, besides not relying on the random-oracle heuristic and being efficient, are the only randomizable proofs known to date-requires a common reference string (CRS). Therefore, instead of assuming the existence of a trusted CRS "in the sky", we entrust the judge with its setup and let him use the contained trapdoor constructively rather than "forgetting" it.
The paper is now organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the procedures constituting a transferable e-cash scheme with a judge, and we detail its security properties in Section 3. In Section 4 we give the main cryptographic tools used to instantiate our scheme, which we describe in Section 5.
Definitions for Transferable E-cash with Judge
In this section, we first describe the algorithms for transferable e-cash, involving a bank B, users U and a judge J . We extend the model given in [4] to include the judge authority. Moreover, in accordance with [4] , the bank B may be divided into two entities: W for the withdrawal phase and D for the deposit phase.
Algorithms
For simplicity and contrary to [4] , we represent a coin simply as a value c, while its identifier Id is the value that the bank retrieves during a deposit to check for double-spending. Formally, a transferable e-cash system with judge, denoted Π, is composed of the following procedures, where λ is a security parameter.
-ParamGen(1 λ ) is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs the parameters of the system par. In the following, we assume that par contains λ and that it is a default input of all the other algorithms.
-BKeyGen(), JKeyGen() and UKeyGen() are probabilistic algorithms executed respectively by B, J or U, that output a key pair. When BKeyGen() is executed by B, the output is (sk B , pk B ). The secret key sk B may be divided into two parts: sk W for the withdrawal phase and sk D for the deposit phase. Consequently, we define separate algorithms WKeyGen() and DKeyGen() for the bank's key generation. The output of JKeyGen() is a keypair (sk J , pk J ) for the judge, and UKeyGen() outputs (sk U , pk U ).
As a convention, we assume that each secret key contains the corresponding public key.
) is an interactive protocol where U withdraws one transferable coin from B. At the end, U either gets a coin c and outputs ok, or it outputs ⊥. The output of B is either its view V W B of the protocol (including pk U ), or ⊥ in case of error.
is an interactive protocol in which U 1 spends/transfers the coin c to U 2 . At the end, U 2 outputs either a coin c or ⊥, and U 1 either tags the coin c as spent and outputs ok, or outputs ⊥. Else, B adds (Id, c) to its list L, credits U's account, and returns L. U's output is ok or ⊥. -Identify(Id, c, c , sk J ) is a deterministic algorithm executed by the judge J that outputs a key pk U and a proof τ G . If the users who had submitted c and c are not malicious, then τ G is a proof that pk U is the registered key of a user that double-spent a coin. If Id = 0, this signifies that the judge cannot conclude. -VerifyGuilt(pk U , τ G ) is a deterministic algorithm that can be executed by anyone. It outputs 1 if τ G is correct and 0 otherwise.
The main differences between these algorithms and those described in [4] is the additional key generation algorithm JKeyGen() and the modification of the procedure to identify a defrauder in case of a double-spending detection.
Global Variables and Oracles
Before formalizing the security properties, we first define the adversary's means of interaction with his challenger in the security experiments of a transferable e-cash system: we introduce global variables (in accordance with to [4] ) and oracles 1 .
Global variables. The set of public (resp. secret) user keys is denoted by PK = {(i, pk i ) : i ∈ N} (resp. SK = {(i, sk i ) : i ∈ N} with sk i =⊥ if user i is corrupted). The set of views by the bank of the withdrawals done by the adversary is denoted by SC (for supplied coins) and the set of all coins owned by the oracles is denoted by OC (for obtained coins). The set of deposited electronic cash (corresponding to L) is denoted by DC (for deposited coins). In addition, we define the set of users who have received a coin from the adversary, denoted by RU; and the set of users who have spent a coin to the adversary, denoted by SU. These modifications should improve the understanding of the original description of oracles provided in [4] .
Creation and corruption of users. In all cases, the coins belonging to user i, stored in OC, are also given to A.
Withdrawal protocol. We define three oracles relating to withdrawal. Spending protocol. Here we take into account that during a Spend protocol the adversary can play the role of the payer, the receiver, or can only be a passive observer. This will be relevant for the anonymity experiments in Section 3.4.
-The oracle Rcv(i) allows A to spend a coin to user i. The oracle plays the role of U 2 with the secret key of user i in the Spend protocol. It updates the set OC by adding a new entry (i, j, c) and adds i to the set RU. -The oracle Spd(i, j) enables A to receive either the coin j or a coin transferred from user i. Either i or j can be undetermined (equal to ⊥). The owner i of the spent coin j is then added to SU. The oracle plays the role of user U 1 in the Spend protocol with the secret key of the owner i of the coin j in OC. It uses the entry (i, j, c) of OC as the Spend protocol describes it. It finally updates this entry by changing the flag to 1.
-The oracle S&R (spend-and-receive) permits A to observe the spending of a coin j between users i 1 (in the role of U 1 ) and i 2 (in the role of U 2 ), who are both played by the oracle. It updates OC by adding (i 2 , j , c) and by flagging the coin j as spent by i 1 . It outputs all the (external) communications of the spending.
Deposit protocol. Depending on who the adversary impersonates there are several oracles for deposit. A consequence of the result by Chaum and Pedersen [6] , who showed that a transferred coin necessarily grows in size, is that an adversary may easily break anonymity by checking the number of times a given coin has been transferred. In the following, we say that two users i 0 and i 1 are compatible, and write comp(i 0 , i 1 ) = 1, if they both own at least one coin with the same size.
Security Properties
In this section, we define the security notions for an e-cash system with a judge, adapting those from Canard and Gouget [4] . In every security game the challenger first generates the parameters and the keys for the bank and the judge; we denote this by AllGen. The challenger then gives the adversary the keys corresponding to the parties he is allowed to impersonate.
Unforgeability
Unforgeability is a notion protecting the bank, meaning that no collection of users can ever spend more coins than they withdrew, even by corrupting the judge. Formally, we have the following definition based on the experiment given below.
Definition 1 (Unforgeability). Let Π be a transferable e-cash system with a judge. For an adversary A and λ ∈ N, we let Succ 
Create,Corrupt,BWith,With,Rcv,Spd,S&R,BDepo,Depo (st, par, sk J , pk B ); Let q W be the number of successful calls to BWith and With; let q D denote the number of successful calls to BDepo and Depo;
Identification of Double-Spenders
This notion guarantees the bank that no collection of users, collaborating with the judge, can spend a coin twice (double-spend) without revealing one of their identities. Formally, we have the following experiment and definition.
Create,Corrupt,BWith,With,Rcv,Spd,S&R,BDepo,Depo,Idt (st, par, sk J , pk B );
Definition 2 (Double-Spender Identification). Let Π be a transferable ecash system with a judge. For any adversary A and λ ∈ N, we let Succ 
Exculpability
This notion protects honest users in that the bank, even when colluding with a collection of malicious users and possibly the judge, cannot falsely accuse (with a proof) honest users of having double-spent a coin. Formally, we have the following experiment and definition. 
← A Create,Corrupt,UWith,Rcv,Spd,S&R,UDepo,Idt (st, par, sk J , sk B ); -If VerifyGuilt(pk i * , τ * ) = 1 and sk i * =⊥, return 1; -Return ⊥.
Definition 3 (Exculpability). Let Π be a transferable e-cash system with judge. For an adversary A and λ ∈ N, we let Succ 
Anonymity Properties in Transferable E-cash
Regarding anonymity, Canard and Gouget [4] distinguish between five different notions: weak anonymity (WA), strong anonymity (SA), full anonymity (FA), and two types of restricted perfect anonymity (PA 1 and PA 2 ). They show that FA implies SA, which implies WA, and that FA, PA 1 and PA 2 are all incomparable. We say the anonymity for a transferable e-cash scheme is optimal when it satisfies the latter 3 properties. We work with the formal definitions of [4] but slightly modify the terminology 6 .
-Observe-then-Receive Full Anonymity (OtR-FA, previously FA): the adversary, impersonating the bank, cannot link a coin he receives as "legitimate" user to a previously (passively) observed transfer between honest users. -Spend-then-Observe Full Anonymity (StO-FA, previously PA 1 ): the adversary, impersonating the bank, cannot link a (passively) observed coin transferred between two honest users to a coin he has already owned as a "legitimate" user. -Spend-then-Receive Full Anonymity (StR-FA, previously PA 2 ): when the bank is honest, the adversary cannot link two transactions involving the same coin, i.e. make the link between two coins he has received.
In the following, we say that a transferable e-cash scheme achieves optimal anonymity if it satisfies at the same time OtR-FA, StO-FA and StR-FA, which are incomparable, according to [4] . These anonymity notions are formally defined below, based on the corresponding experiments given in Figure 1 .
Definition 4 (Anonymity Properties). Let Π be a transferable e-cash system with judge and let c ∈ {otr-fa, sto-fa, str-fa}. For an adversary A and λ ∈ N, we let Adv
. Π is said to be Observe-then-Receive fully anonymous (resp. Spend-then-Observe fully anonymous, Spend-then-Receive fully anonymous) if the function Adv
Create,Corrupt,UWith,Rcv,Spd,S&R,UDepo,Idt ch 
Create,Corrupt,UWith,Rcv,Spd,S&R,UDepo,Idt ch Exp 
Cryptographic Tools
In this section we give the main tools we need to construct our new transferable e-cash system with judge. For each of them, we introduce the concept, give the underlying procedures and formally describe the main security characteristics. 
Assumptions
Our construction will rely on two cryptographic assumptions: the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (DH) assumption and the asymmetric double hidden strong DH assumption, a "q-type" assumption introduced in [1] .
Definition 5 ((SXDH)
and
Groth-Sahai Proofs
Groth and Sahai [9] proposed the first efficient non-interactive proof system for a large class of statements over bilinear groups in the standard model. Those proofs fit our purpose perfectly: their witness indistinguishability guarantees the anonymity of the users that withdraw, transfer and spend coins, and their randomizability provides unlinkability of transferred coins. We use SXDH-based Groth-Sahai commitments and proofs in a pairingfriendly setting in order to commit to elements and prove relations satisfied by the associated plaintexts. The commitment key is:
Depending on whether the commitments should be perfectly binding or perfectly hiding (for simulations in security proofs), the initialization of the parameters will vary between: u 1 = (g 1 , u) with u = g ). Similarly, we define key pairs v 1 and v 2 in G 2 2 with independent randomness.
Commitments to group elements. To commit to X ∈ G 1 with random values s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z p , we set C(X) = (1, X) u Proofs. Under the SXDH assumption, the two initializations of the commitment key are indistinguishable. Groth and Sahai [9] show how to construct proofs that a set of committed values satisfies an equation of a certain type. A proof is in G ; it can be constructed using the committed values satisfying the equation and their randomness, and it is verified w.r.t. the commitments and the commitment key. If the key is set up as perfectly hiding then the proof does not reveal more than the fact that the values satisfy the equation.
Randomization. The commitments can easily be randomized. Given, e.g., a commitment c ∈ G 2 1 , one chooses two random values s 1 , s 2 and computes the randomization as c = (c 1 · u
2,2 ). In [2] it is shown how to randomize and adapt a proof (π, θ) for a vector of commitments (c i ) i to their randomizations (c i ) i .
Commuting Signatures
Commuting signatures and verifiable encryption [7] is a primitive combining a signature scheme (the automorphic signature from [1] , whose messages are group elements) with Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs. This allows one to commit to a message, a verification key, or a corresponding signature (or arbitrary combinations of them), and prove that the committed values are valid (i.e. the signature is valid on the message under the key), via the GS methodology.
Commuting signatures provide several additional functionalities, of which we use the following two.
SigCom: This allows a signer, who is given a commitment C to a message, to make a commitment c Σ to a signature (under his secret key) on that message (without knowing it though) and a proof that c Σ contains a valid signature on the value committed in C. AdC K : Given a commitment to a message, a commitment to a signature and a proof of validity w.r.t. to a verification key, this algorithm allows anyone to commit to that key and adapt the proof; more precisely, AdC K outputs a proof asserting that a commitment contains a valid signature on a committed message under a committed verification key.
Security states that the output of SigCom is the same as if the signer had known the message, signed it, made commitments to the message and the signature and had given a GS proof of validity w.r.t. his signature-verification key. Analogously, the output of AdC K is the same as a proof constructed for the known committed values.
In our e-cash scheme commuting signatures will enable users to produce signatures on values that are only available as commitments and make a proof of validity under their verification key, which is also given as a commitment. Based on the cryptographic building blocks introduced in the last section, we are now in a position to describe our transferable e-cash system with judge. In our solution the withdrawer is anonymous towards the bank, a feature that previous schemes do not offer. This is motivated by the fact that our withdrawal is very similar to the spending protocol and it is easy to make the withdrawer non-anonymous, should one wish to. A possible application of our scheme is the anonymous purchase of tickets which can then be transferred to other users. Another scenario could be e-cash which can be purchased in exchange for actual cash.
Overview of our Solution
A coin is represented by a unique chain of nonces n = n 0 n 1 n 2 · · · , where each n i is randomly chosen by a consecutive owner of the coin. Thus, n 0 is chosen by the bank, n 1 by the withdrawer, n 2 by the one who receives this coin from the withdrawer, and so on.
A double-spending has occurred when two coins n and n are deposited which both begin with n 0 = n 0 . Note that the minimum value i such that n i = n i corresponds to the transfer of the coin where it was double-spent. If we oblige every user to commit to her identity during a transfer and include this commitment in the coin then a judge holding an extraction key can trace the defrauder.
When a coin is transferred from U i to U i+1 , the spender U i signs the following: (i) the nonce she chose when receiving the coin (during a spending or withdrawal), (ii) the nonce chosen by the receiver U i+1 , and (iii) U i+1 's verification key. The latter binds this transfer to the next one, where U i+1 will use her signing key. In fact, since only U i+1 knows the secret key corresponding to the signed public key, she is the only one able to spend the coin.
However, to remain anonymous, U i+1 cannot let the spender know her verification key. This is where commuting signatures come into play: they allow the signer to make (a commitment to) a signature on the receiver's key, even when it is only given to the signer as a commitment. Since SigCom additionally outputs a proof, validity of the committed signature is publicly verifiable.
When a coin is spent, its entire history (i.e. committed nonces, keys, signatures and proofs of their validity from previous transfers) is transmitted. This will guarantee unforgeability, identification of double-spending and non-frameability, without requiring data to be stored by the user and provided later on demand to prove innocence (as was the case in the relaxed model in [8] ). Every time a coin is transferred, its history (consisting of commitments and GrothSahai proofs) can be completely randomized. Thus, a previous owner of a coin cannot recognize it at a later moment; this is how our scheme achieves strong anonymity notions.
Key-Generation Algorithms
During the generation phase, the judge J generates two pairs of commitment/extraction keys, which will enable identification of double spenders. Similarly, the double-spending detector D also generates such a key pair.
We denote a commitment under J 's keys by either c (first key) orc (second key) and a commitment under D's key by d. Using their secret extraction keys, the judge and the detector can open commitments under their respective keys using Open J and Open D .
The judge also generates a key pair for a commuting signature scheme; in the following, a signature on m from J is denoted Sign J (m). Moreover, the bank B and each user U generate key pairs (bsk, bpk) and (usk, upk) for the commuting signature scheme. When registering, a user U obtains from the judge J a signature on her verification key as membership certificate: cert = Sign J (upk). In the following, we differentiate the users by different indices: U 1 , U 2 , etc.
Withdrawal Protocol
The withdrawal protocol involves a user U 1 and the bank B. In a nutshell, the bank B generates a random nonce n 0 and the user a random nonce n 1 , which together will be the beginning of the serial number of the coin. The bank then signs these nonces and the user's public key upk 1 , which will bind the user's identity to the coin and enable tracing in case of double spending.
However, to guarantee anonymity, rather than sending these values in the clear, the user sends commitments to them. She also adds a commitment to her certificate and a proof of validity, which convinces the bank that she is registered. This can be done since the certificate is an automorphic signature [1] , for which GS proofs can be used to prove that a committed value is a signature on another committed value, in this case upk 1 , valid under the judge's verification key.
The bank now has to construct a committed signature on the values n 0 , n 1 and upk 1 , which are only given in the form of commitments. This is where we take advantage of the functionality SigCom of the commuting-signature scheme introduced in Section 4.3: given commitments, a signer can produce a commitment to a signature on the values contained in them, together with a proof of validity of the signature.
All these commitments will be done w.r.t. the judge's commitment key. To enable the double-spending detector D to detect a double-spending (however without breaking the user's anonymity), we do the following: in addition to committing to the nonces w.r.t. the judge's key, the user and the bank make another commitment d ni to n i under D's key. In order to show that this was done correctly, we require a proof that two commitments w.r.t. different keys contain the same value. This can be done by using two instances of GrothSahai proofs on top of each other, as was done in [8] . The outer layer is the one corresponding to c, which will enable us to simulate such a proof when the commitment key for c is set up as hiding, but the key for d is still binding.
We formalize the above in the following protocol:
U 1 picks at random a nonce n 1 and makes two extractable commitments (for J and D) to n 1 denoted respectively by c n1 and d n1 , and a proof π n1 that the two committed values are equal. Moreover, U 1 makes commitments c u1 ,c u1 and c c1 to its public key upk 1 and its certificate cert 1 , respectively, together with a proof π c1 that the value in c c1 is a valid signature on the value in c u1 , i.e. cert 1 = Sign J (upk 1 ), and a proofπ u1 that the committed values on c u1 andc u1 are equal. U 1 sends the following values to the bank: (c n1 , c u1 , c c1 , π c1 ). B after verifying π c1 now also generates a random nonce n 0 and makes two commitments (for J and D) to n 0 denoted by c n0 and d n0 , and a proof π n0 that the two committed values are equal. B produces a committed signature c s1 on the values n 0 , n 1 and upk 1 by running SigCom on c n0 , c n1 and c u1 ; this also outputs a proof π s1 of validity of c s1 w.r.t. c n0 , c n1 and c u1 and the bank's verification key (which is public). The bank sends all these values, from which the user forms the coin
In the sequel, this coin will be randomized before being spent. The result of randomizing coin 1 is denoted coin
1 and consists of randomizing all its components, i.e. commitments and proofs, as described in [2] . After randomization, we have thus coin
Spending Protocol
This is a protocol between a user U 1 holding a coin as in (1) and a user U 2 playing the role of the receiver. The protocol is very similar to the withdrawal protocol, except for two points. First, U 1 has to randomize the coin, which prevents a later linking of the coin. Note that, due to the contained proofs, the validity of a coin is publicly verifiable.
Second, while the bank's verification key is public, U 1 's key must remain hidden. Thus, after U 1 produces a commitment to a signature on the values n 1 , n 2 (the nonce chosen by U 2 ), and U 2 's public key upk 2 , and a proof that verifies w.r.t. her public key upk 1 , U 1 does the following: using the functionality AdC K (described in Section 4.3), she converts the proof into one asserting that the committed signature is valid under the value committed in c (1) u1 (i.e. the randomization of the commitment to upk 1 ).
U 2 picks at random a nonce n 2 and commits to it as c n2 and d n2 (for J and D) and makes a proof π n2 of equality of the committed values. U 2 makes further commitments c u2 ,c u2 and c c2 to her public key upk 2 and her certificate cert 2 , together with a proof π c2 that c c2 contains a valid certificate and a proofπ u2 that the committed values in c u2 andc u2 are equal. She sends (c n2 , c u2 , c c2 , π c2 ) to U 1 U 1 checks the proof sent by U 2 and randomizes coin 1 to coin SigCom: this generates a commitment c s2 to a signature on the values n 1 , n 2 and upk 2 , as well as a proof π s2 of validity of c s2 on c n1 , c n2 , c u2 w.r.t. upk 1 . Running AdC K , U 1 converts π s2 to a proof π s2 asserting validity w.r.t. the key committed in c (1) u2 . Note that this works since c u1 was produced and randomized to c (1) u1 by U 1 , who therefore knows its randomness. Finally, U 1 sends U 2 the following: (coin (1) 1 , c s2 , π s2 ). U 2 checks the proofs contained in coin , c n2 , d n2 , π n2 , c u2 ,c u2 ,π u2 , c c2 , π c2 , c s2 , π s2 ) .
Deposit and Identify Procedures
To deposit a coin, a user spends it to the bank, that is, she runs the protocol from the last section with the bank playing the role of U 2 . In order to detect a double-spending given a coin, the detector D opens all the commitments d
n contained in it, using her extraction key. She thus obtains the serial number n = n 0 n 1 · · · n of this coin, which allows her to check whether the coin was double-spent.
To do so, D checks whether n 0 already exists in her database. If this is not the case then the Deposit is validated and the list L is updated by adding n = n 0 n 1 · · · n . Otherwise, if a serial numberñ beginning with n 0 already exists in her database then with overwhelming probability the coin was double-spent and D outputs ⊥ 1 . She compares the two serial numbers n = n 0 n 1 n 2 · · · n andñ = n 0 ñ 1 ñ 2 · · · ñ and stops at the last i 0 such that n i0 =ñ i0 . She finally asks for the execution of the Identify procedure by the Judge on input the two related spendings and i 0 .
To identify the double spender, the judge extracts the value committed in c ui 0 using her extraction key, which reveals the public key upk i0 of the defrauder. The proof τ G of identification is a proof of correct opening of the commitment, as done in [8] .
Security Considerations
We now sketch how to prove that our scheme is secure. We have to show that it fulfills all the security requirements given in Section 3. Claim 1. Our transferable e-cash system with a judge is secure under the following assumptions: unforgeability of the commuting signature scheme and soundness and witness indistinguishability of Groth-Sahai proofs.
Unforgeability. Let us assume that an adversary is able to break the unforgeability of our transferable e-cash scheme. We use it as a black box to design a machine which breaks commuting signatures, i.e. their unforgeability under chosen-message attacks.
Given a challenge public key by our challenger, we use it as the bank's public key and generate the remaining parameters as described in our e-cash scheme (without any modifications), and send it to the adversary. We answer all oracle queries by the adversary either by using the appropriate key or by querying the signing oracle provided by our challenger (for BWith and With calls).
Suppose the adversary wins the game. For each of the q D successfully deposited coins, using the judge's extraction key we open the commitments c s1 , c n0 , c n1 and c u1 . By soundness of π s1 , the extracted signature s 1 is valid on (n 0 , n 1 , upk 1 ), the other extracted values, under the bank's public key. Since every deposit was successful, none of the q D coins was double-spent, which means that their n 0 components are all different. We have thus q D signatures on different triples (n 0 , n 1 , upk 1 ). On the other hand, there were fewer calls (q W ) to withdraw oracles, and thus fewer calls to our signing oracle. There must thus be a signature on a message which was not queried to the signing oracle. We output that signature/message pair as a forgery and win thus the unforgeability game with the same probability as the adversary.
Identification of double-spender. As for unforgeability, we use a successful adversary to break unforgeability of the commuting signature scheme. This time we use the public key given by our challenger as the judge's public key and set up the remaining parameters as described in our scheme. We can therefore answer any oracle call by the adversary, except for the certification of a new user in the system (oracle Create), for which we use our signing oracle.
At some point the adversary makes a call to the BDepot oracle that is answered as (⊥ 2 , Id, c, c ), i.e. a double-spending is detected. If the adversary is successful then Identify outputs (i * , τ G ) such that either VerifyGuilt(pk i * , τ G ) = 0 or i * = 0. Since each valid coin must contain a valid certificate for the public key corresponding to each transfer, by soundness of the proofs, the adversary must have forged the certificate. Otherwise Identify would have output an existing user key.
Exculpability. This is shown similarly to unforgeability, except that here we focus on signatures issued by an honest user rather than the bank.
A user with public key upk is accused of double-spending when there are two coins c and c with serial numbers n and n , such that for some index i, we have n 0 = n 0 , . . . , n i = n i and n i+1 = n i+1 , and moreover c ui contains the user's public key upk. Since both coins are valid, by the soundness of the proofs, they contain signatures on (n i , n i+1 , upk i+1 ) and (n i , n i+1 , upk i+1 ), respectively.
Since an honest user does not transfer or spend one of his coins twice, and it only happens with negligible probability that she chooses twice the same nonce n i when receiving two different coins, one of the signatures must be a forgery.
The adversary we build against unforgeability of the commuting signature scheme receives the challenge public key and sets it as the public key of a randomly chosen user. It uses the signing oracle to simulate this user, whenever the adversary asks her to spend/transfer a coin. If the probability that the e-cash adversary wins the exculpability game is non-negligible then so is the probability that he wins by framing the user chosen by the simulator. We break thus unforgeability of the commuting signature.
Anonymity properties.
-To achieve Spend-the-Observe Full Anonymity, it suffices to encrypt the messages sent between the users when transferring a coin; this was shown in [4] . -Spend-then-Receive Full Anonymity (formerly known as PA 2 ) is harder to achieve, since the adversary is given the challenge coin, which he could already have owned before; the adversary therefore must not know the key to detect double-spendings. Groth-Sahai proofs are witness indistinguishable in the following sense: if the commitment key is set up as perfectly hiding then the commitments are random values independent of the committed values and the proofs are distributed equally for any such values-as long as they satisfy the equations. Thus, if we set up all commitment keys (the two for the judge and one for the double-spending detector), a coin would not reveal anything about the chosen nonces, the public keys and certificates of its owners and their signatures. Moreover, after being transferred, the coins are perfectly unlinkable, since a randomization transforms one set of random values into an independent set of random values (conditioned on the fact that the values that could have been committed satisfy the equations). However, if the coins do not contain any information, we cannot correctly simulate the experiment for StR-FA. In particular, we cannot simulate the deposit and identification oracles, which rely on the detector's and the judge's extraction keys. This is the reason why we introduced the commitments d andc, which double some of the values committed in the c's, namely the nonces and the user public keys. The anonymity properties are shown by a sequence of game hops. The first game is the original game, and in the second we extract from the commitments d andc to detect and trace double-spendings. In a third game, we set up the judge's key for the commitments c as perfectly hiding. Under SXDH this changes the adversary's behavior only negligibly. In a forth game we simulate the proofs π ni andπ ui of equality of commitments under different keys. This can be done using the trapdoor information for the key for the c-commitments. Finally, we mentioned in Section 4.2 that commitments under binding keys are actually ElGamal encryptions of the committed value. Under SXDH we can thus replace such encryptions by random pairs of elements from the corresponding group. When we perform the challenge spending via Spd in the experiment, we replace the commitments/encryptions d ni andc ui by random values. This is done by a sequence of hybrid games, replacing one value after the other. In the final game now the challenge coin is perfectly random, and does thus not contain any information about the bit b. The adversary's probability of winning the game is thus 1 2 . This concludes the proof for StR-FA as the final game is indistinguishable from the original game.
-The remaining notion, OtR-FA, is proved similarly, but here we cannot replace values d by random ones, as the adversary gets the corresponding extraction key, contained in sk B . However, we can simply leave the values d in the challenge coin unchanged, as the adversary has never seen them before: he has never owned the coin and does not get the value d n1 when impersonating the bank during a withdraw.
